Many surveys contain a wealth of subjective questions that are at rst glance rather exciting. Examples include How important is leisure time to you?", How satis ed are you with yourself?", or How satis ed are you with your work?" Yet despite easy availability, this is one data source that economists rarely use. In fact, the unwillingness to rely on such questions marks an important divide between economists and other social scientists.
increments ending with 4 1 2 + hours. The other respondents were given the same scale except the rst ve answers were compressed so that it began with 2 1 2 hours. Only 16 of the respondents given the rst set of response alternatives reported watching more than two hours and a half of TV perday. 32 of the respondents given the second set of response alternatives reported watching more than two hours and a half of TV perday. Respondents thus appear to beinferring normal" TV viewing from the scale. The rst scale, with a ner partition in the 0 , 2 hours range, suggests to subjects that this amount of TV viewing is common. In fact, stating that the survey's purpose is to estimate the amount of TV viewing greatly diminishes the scale e ect.
An even more fundamental problem is that respondents may make little mental e ort in answering the question, such as by not attempting to recall all the relevant information or by not reading through the whole list of alternative responses. As a consequence, the ordering of response alternatives provided matter since subjects may simply pick the rst or last available alternatives in a list. In the General Social Survey, for example, respondents are asked to list the most and least desirable qualities that a child may h a v e out of a list of 13 qualities. Researchers surveyed people and gave them this list in either the GSS order or in reverse order. They found that subjects would rate the rst or last listed qualities, whatever they were, as most important.
Social Desirability
Beyond purely cognitive issues, the social nature of the survey procedure also appears to play a big role in shaping answers to subjective questioning. Respondents want t o a v oid looking bad in front of the interviewer. A famous example is that roughly 25 of non-voters report having voted immediately after an election. This over-reporting is strongest among those that value norms of political participation the most and those who originally intended on voting.
Other studies have noted that if one adds to a voting question a quali er that Many people do not vote because something unexpectedly arose...," the discrepancy rate between self-reported voting and actual voting drops.
Another example can befound in the self-reporting of racial attitude. Much evidence suggests people are unwilling to report prejudice. For example, reported prejudice increases when respondents believe they are being psychologically monitored for truth telling and decreases when the survey is administered by a black person.
Non-Attitudes, Wrong Attitudes and Soft Attitudes
Perhaps the most devastating problem with subjective questions, however, is the possibility that attitudes may not exist" in a coherent form. A rst indication of such problems is that measured attitudes are quite unstable over time. For example, in two surveys spaced a few months apart, the same subjects were asked about their views on government spending. Amazingly, 55 of the subjects reported di erent answers. Such low correlations at high frequencies are quite representative.
Part of the problem comes from respondents' reluctance to admit lack of an attitude. Simply because the surveyor is asking the question, respondents believe that they should have an opinion about it. For example, researchers have shown that large minorities would respond to questions about obscure or even ctitious issues, such as providing opinions on countries that don't exist.
A second, more profound, problem is that people may often be wrong about their attitudes".
People may not really be good at forecasting their behavior or understanding why they did what they did. In a well-known experiment, subjects are placed in a room where two ropes are hanging from the ceiling and are asked to tie the two ropes together. The two ropes are su ciently far apart than one cannot merely grab one by the hand and then grab the other one. With no other information, few of the subjects are able to solve the problem. In a treatment group, the experimenter accidentally bumps into one of the ropes, setting it swinging. Many more people solve the problem in this case: subjects now see that they can set the ropes swinging and grab one on an up arc. Yet when they are debriefed and asked how they solved the problem, few of the subjects recognize that it was the jostling by the experimenter that led them to the solution.
A nal and related problem is cognitive dissonance. Subjects may report and even feel attitudes that are consistent with their behavior and past attitudes. In one experiment, individuals are asked to perform a tedious task and then paid either very little or a lot for it.
When asked afterwards how they liked the task, those who are paid very little report greater enjoyment. They likely reason to themselves, If I didn't enjoy the task, why w ould I have done it for nothing?" Rather than admit that they should just have told the experimenter that they were leaving, they prefer to think that the task was actually interesting. In this case, behavior shapes attitudes and not the other way around.
II.AMEASUREMENT ERROR PERSPECTIVE
What do these ndings imply for statistical work using subjective data? Let us adopt a measurement error perspective and assume that reported attitudes equal true attitudes plus some error term, A = A + . Statistically, we readily understand the case where is white noise. The above evidence however suggests two important ways in which the measurement error in attitude questions will be more than white noise. First, the mean of the error term will not necessarily be zero within a survey. For example, the fact that a survey uses forbid" rather than allow" in a question will a ect answers. Second, many of the ndings in the literature suggest that the error term will be correlated with observable and unobservable characteristics of the individual. For example, the misreporting of voting is higher in certain demographic groups e.g. those that place more social value on voting.
There are two types of analysis that can be performed with subjective variables: using attitudes to explain behavior or explaining attitudes themselves. We will examine how mismeasurement a ects both types of analyses. First, suppose we are interested in using self-reported attitudes to explain behavior. White noise in the measurement of A will produce an attenuation bias, i.e. a bias towards zero. The rst measurement problem listed above, a survey xed e ect, will produce no bias as long as the appropriate controls such as year or survey speci c dummies are included.
The second problem, correlation with individual characteristics X and Z will create a bias:
c will now include both the true e ect of attitude and the fact that the measurement error 6 in A is correlated with unobservables. Hence, assuming that measurement error problems are not dominant, subjective variables can beuseful as control variables but care must betaken in interpreting it. The estimated coe cient does not only capture the e ect of attitude but also the e ect of other variables that in uence how the attitude is self-reported. This is closely related to the causality problem that we often encounter even with perfectly measured variables. Let us now turn to the second type of analysis, where we are attempting to explain attitudes themselves. For example, we might ask whether high work hours increase loneliness. Speci cally, suppose we estimate A it = a + bX it + , while the true model is A it = + X it + Z it .
In this setup, the white noise in the measurement of attitudes no longer causes bias. But the other biases now play a m uch more important role. Speci cally, the fact that measurement error is correlated with individual characteristics will now severely bias X. For example, suppose we see that those from rich backgrounds have a greater preference for money. As noted earlier, this might simply re ect the fact that a rich background a ects the reporting of the preference for money. Such a correlation could thus bepurely spurious. Notice that this problem is far more severe than in the previous analysis. First, the fact that an X helps predict attitude" means very little if it is only predicting the measurement error in attitude. So, one cannot argue as one did before that simply helping to predict is a good thing, irrespective of causality. Second, this is a problem that is much harder to solve than an omitted variable bias problem. For example, it is hard to see how an instrumental variable could resolve this issue. One would need an instrument that a ects X but not the measurement of attitude. But the above evidence tells us that X will likely a ect measurement in a causal sense. This makes it very unlikely that such an instrument could be found in most contexts.
To summarize, interpreting the experimental evidence in a measurement error framework provides two important insights. First, if the measurement error is small enough, subjective measures may be helpful as independent variables in predicting outcomes, with the caveat that the coe cients must be interpreted with care. Second, subjective v ariables cannot reasonably be used as dependent variables given that the measurement error likely correlates in a very causal way with the explanatory variables.
III.HOW MUCH NOISE IS THERE?
This leaves the important quantitative question: how much white noise error is there in the subjective questions we might be interested in? Can we in fact gain anything by adding responses to subjective questions to our econometric models?
To assess this, we turn to the High School & Beyond's Senior sample, which surveyed seniors in school in 1980 and then followed them every two years until 1986. This sample provides us with a set of subjective and objective variables in each of these waves.
In the rst 8 columns of Table 1 , we correlate answers to a set of attitude variables with future income thereby removing mechanical correlations with current income. Each cell in the Table corresponds to a separate regression. The dependent variable is logsalary in 1985. In row 1, we add as control the sex, race and educational attainment of the respondent. Answers to the subjective questions clearly help predict individual income. A set of correlations are very intuitive. People that value money or a steady job more earn more. People that value social goals such as correcting inequalities around them earn less. People that have a positive attitude towards themselves earn more. Maybe somewhat intriguing, we nd that people that care about their family earn substantially more. Even more intriguing, people that value leisure time also earn more. The second row shows that respondents' attitudes do not simply proxy for objective family background characteristics. Controlling for parents' education and family income in the senior year does not weaken the predictive p o w er of the attitude variables. In row 3, we show that attitude questions stay predictive of future income even after one controls for current individual income.
As a whole, these results suggest that noise does not dominate the measurement of these subjective questions. Attitudes actually predict income even beyond past income and background characteristics. Of course, we are not arguing for causality, merely that attitude variables add explanatory power. In column 9, we investigate whether answers to reservation wage questions are correlated with future income. Are individuals that report higher reservation wage today likely to earn more in the future? We see a very strong relationship between reservation wage and future income, even after controlling for the individual's education, sex and race. This holds true even if we add controls for family background row 2 or family background and current income row 3. However, changes in reported reservation wages do not help predict changes in income row 4. In summary, answers to reservation wage questions do appear to capture some unobserved individual characteristics and might b e w orth including when trying to predict individual income.
Changes in reported reservation wages however provide no information about changes in income.
Finally, in column 10, we ask whether answers to job satisfaction questions help predict future job turnover. Again, we nd that people's self-reported satisfaction with their job as a whole" is a strong predictor of their probability o f c hanging job or not in the future. 3 
IV. CONCLUSION
Four main messages emerge from this discussion. First, a large experimental literature by and large supports economists' skepticism of subjective questions. Second, put in an econometric framework, these ndings cast serious doubts on attempts to use subjective data as dependent variables because the measurement error appears to correlate with a large set of characteristics and behaviors. For example, a drop in reported racism over time may simply re ect an increased reluctance to report racism. Since much of the interesting applications would likely use these data as dependent variables, this is a rather pessimistic conclusion. Third, and on a brighter note, these data may be useful as explanatory variables. One must, however, take care in interpreting the results since the ndings may not be causal. Finally, our empirical work suggests that subjective variables are in practice useful for explaining di erences in behavior across individuals. Changes in answers to these questions, however, do not appear useful in explaining changes in behavior. 2. An extreme example of this occurs when the measurement error is correlated with the variable of interest itself as is suggested by cognitive dissonance. For example, people may report a lower preference for money if they are making less money. This is a case of pure reverse causation.
3. In this case, we are not able to study a xed e ect model as the job satisfaction question was only asked in the second and third follow u p o f the data.
